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Abstract
The Lega Nord (LN) has undergone a profound process of transformation since 2013, by replacing its historical regionalist
populism with a new state‐wide populist radical right outlook. However, very little is known about how such transfor‐
mation impacted its organizational model, particularly the mass‐party features that characterized it under its founding
leader, Umberto Bossi. This article explores the organizational evolution of the party under Matteo Salvini by means of a
qualitative in‐depth analysis of 41 semi‐structured interviews with representatives of the LN from four regions
(Calabria, Emilia‐Romagna, Lombardy, and Veneto) and primary documents. It underlines that the LNwas turned into a dis‐
empowered and politically inactive “bad company,” charged with the task of paying the debts of the old party,
while its structure, resources, and personnel were poured into a new state‐wide organization called Lega per Salvini
Premier (LSP). The LSP has not simply maintained the key features of the mass‐party in the LN’s historical strongholds,
but also pioneered a modern form of this organizational model grounded on the continuous interaction between digital
and physical activism, i.e., “phygital activism,” which boosts the party’s ability to reach out to the electorate by deliver‐
ing the image that the League is constantly on the ground. The LSP has sought to export this modern interpretation of
the mass‐party in the South; however, in that area its organizational development remains at an embryonic stage, and
the party’s nationalization strategy has so far produced a “quasi‐colonial” structure dominated by, and dependent on, the
Northern elite.
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1. Introduction
For much of its existence, the Lega Nord (LN) was led
by a Lombard elite dominated by its founding leader,
Umberto Bossi, who concentrated his efforts on build‐
ing amass‐party inspired by the organizational principles
and practices of Leninist parties. While the existing liter‐
ature has provided excellent analyses of the mass‐party
features of the “old” LN (e.g., Albertazzi, 2016; Albertazzi
& McDonnell, 2015; McDonnell & Vampa, 2016), very
little is known about how the disempowerment of the
old LN in favour of a new, state‐wide, organization called
Lega per Salvini Premier (LSP) impacted on its long‐
standing organizational model.
This article fills this gap by relying on the qualitative
in‐depth analysis of 41 semi‐structured interviews with
representatives of the LSP in Calabria, Emilia‐Romagna,
Lombardy, and Veneto, along with primary documents.
In linewith the analytical framework outlined in the intro‐
duction to this thematic issue on right‐wing populist par‐
ties (Albertazzi & van Kessel, 2021), this article explores
the organizational structure of the new LSP, shedding
light on how it attracts new members and activists, the
role of the internet and socialmedia in party organization
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and activism, the reasons to grow an active base of
activists, and the degree of centralization of power and
internal democracy.
This article is structured as follows: After a section
presenting the research design and methods adopted,
an outline of the historical evolution of the LN follows,
explaining how the latter was transformed into a disem‐
powered “bad company” in favour of the new LSP. Then,
it explains how LSP has sought to foster and modern‐
ize the mass‐party organizational model inherited from
the old LN in the historical strongholds in the North,
while seeking to export its key features to the whole
country. The article subsequently discusses the hyper‐
centralized nature of the LSP and the virtual lack of inter‐
nal democracy—features that are interlinked with the
long‐standing imperative of democratic centralism that
characterized Bossi’s LN since its origins.
This article shows that the LSP has successfully
developed a modern conception of the mass‐party
grounded on the key principle of “phygital” activism,
which combines physical activism on the ground and
digital activism, suggesting that a traditional organiza‐
tional model can be updated by taking advantage of new
technologies. Phygital activism is well‐oiled and fostered
in Northern regions, where it enables the LSP to perform
the traditional functions of the mass‐party model in a
faster, more efficient, and immediate way.
This modern conception of the mass‐party model is
consolidated in the North and has been exported to the
South. However, the strategy of organizational national‐
ization of the LSP is still in its infancy, and territorial pene‐
tration in the South is being pursued in a “quasi‐colonial”
way by Salvini and his most loyal collaborators, raising
doubts about its future sustainability.
2. Research Design and Methods
By adopting the analytical framework outlined in the
introduction to this thematic issue, this article tackles
two major points. First, it assesses whether the new LSP
has maintained key features of the mass‐party organi‐
zational model, which were evident during Bossi’s era,
despite the profound change of its ideology and geo‐
graphic scope under the leadership of Matteo Salvini.
Second, the article explores the strategy of organiza‐
tional nationalization of a (formerly) regionalist party
which, for much of its history, had found its raison
d’être in a delimited geographic area (i.e., Northern Italy).
Hence, the LSP as a case‐study can substantially enhance
our understanding of how parties implement “strategic
decisions of adopting organizational changes in order to
pursue their goals” (Borz & Janda, 2020, p. 3) as well
as that of party nationalization strategies (e.g., Borz &
De Miguel, 2019).
In this respect, it is worth recalling that Stockemer
et al. (2018) argued that the study of the demand‐side
of populist radical right politics can be greatly improved
through in‐depth analyses, providing room for voices
fromwithin the party. This articlemaintains that focusing
on the attitudes, views, and perspectives fromwithin the
party is even more pressing when it comes to the study
of party organization, an essential feature of the supply‐
side of populist politics (see Heinisch &Mazzoleni, 2016).
Hence, methodologically speaking, this article
focuses on the detailed analysis of party statutes
(LN, 2015, 2021; LSP, 2018) and regulations (LSP, 2021)
and, in particular, on the qualitative in‐depth analysis
of 41 semi‐structured interviews with representatives
and former representatives of the LN and/or LSP in
Calabria, Emilia‐Romagna, Lombardy, and Veneto, con‐
ducted between November 2019 and June 2021. These
regions were chosen to maximize variation in terms of
party history, strength, and organizational development:
the historical power centre of the LN/LSP (Lombardy), its
current electoral stronghold (Veneto), an area in which
the left has historically been dominant (Emilia‐Romagna),
and a Southern region where the party has attempted to
export its organizational model (Calabria).
Interviewees were purposefully sampled: Snowball
chains developed with those who agreed to be inter‐
viewed as well as with the help of the party, and par‐
ticipants were sought until theoretical saturation was
reached (Kvale, 1996). All interviewees matched the cri‐
teria for purposive sampling as they are in a privileged
position to shed light on the research questions men‐
tioned above. All the interviewees occupy or occupied
different roles within the LN/LSP at the various territorial
levels of the party organization and/or or represent(ed)
the LN/LSP in local, regional, or national institutions (for
details see the Supplementary Material).
3. From Lega Nord to the Division of Labour Between
Two Leagues: The “Good” and the “Bad” Company
The LN finds its roots in the mobilization of regionalist
parties in Northern Italy since the late 1970s, which even‐
tually merged in 1991 under the undisputed leadership
of Bossi. Since then, LN has enjoyed uninterrupted par‐
liamentary presence, making it the oldest parliamentary
actor in the country. Even though its electoral perfor‐
mance has fluctuated over time (Figures 1 and 2), the
impact of LN on Italian politics has been remarkable, as
shown by its key role in coalition dynamics (Zulianello,
2019) and by its repeated participation in national gov‐
ernments (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015).
LN played a critical role in the collapse of the party
system that dominated Italian politics in the post‐war
period by bringing to the fore the so‐called “Northern
question.” The LN successfully activated a dormant
centre‐periphery cleavage counterpoising the interest
and values of the “hard‐working” Northerners against
those of the “vexatious” central state and the “lazy”
Southerners: Thanks to such features, the ideational pro‐
file of the party was constituted, for much of its history,
by a populist form of regionalism (Newth, 2019; also
cf. Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015).








1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013 2018







1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019
Figure 2. Vote share (in %) in European elections (1994–2019). Source: Electoral Archive of the Italian Interior Ministry
(2021).
Bossi was the uncontested leader of LN until 2012,
when a scandal regarding the misappropriation of party
funds led to his resignation. Following the short‐lived
leadership of Roberto Maroni, Matteo Salvini became
the new Federal Secretary in 2013 and his election repre‐
sented a key discontinuity in comparison with the past,
since he did not belong to the founding group of the
party. As Albertazzi et al. (2018, p. 662) underline, under
Salvini “the regionalist cause was dropped… thus trans‐
forming in a most profound way one of the key com‐
ponents of the LN’s ideology.” Even though there are
good reasons to identify populism and nativism as ele‐
ments of continuity between the “old” and the “new” LN
(Newth, 2019), the ideological trajectory undertaken by
Salvini has made the party a fully‐fledged populist radi‐
cal right actor (Albertazzi et al., 2018; cf. Mudde, 2007,
pp. 56–57). Before the 2018 general elections, the adjec‐
tive “Northern” was even dropped from the electoral
symbol of the party: On that occasion, LNmade consider‐
able inroads across the peninsula, including in the South
(Albertazzi & Zulianello, 2021), establishing itself as the
leading force within the centre‐right, with 17.4% of the
votes and outpolling Forza Italia for the first time (14.0%).
Subsequently, it even became themost voted‐for party in
the country (34.3% in the 2019 EU elections).
The abandonment of regionalist populism has been
accompanied by the effort to export an organiza‐
tional model tailored to a territorially defined area
(the so‐called Padania) to the whole Italian territory.
The first steps in developing a state‐wide organization
were undertaken shortly after Salvini’s election as party
secretary of the LN, as in 2014 he launched a sister party
called Noi con Salvini (NcS; literally “Us with Salvini”) to
contest sub‐national elections in Southern Italy.
Meanwhile, the LN was facing increasing pressures
from Italian authorities, who were investigating the scan‐
dal related to themisappropriation of party funds for pri‐
vate purposes that had led to Bossi’s resignation in 2012.
The amount of the fraudwas estimated in EUR 49million
by judicial authorities; to prevent the risk of bankruptcy,
Roberto Calderoli exited the parliamentary group of the
LN in the senate in 2017 and deposited the statute of
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the new political actor LSP, which was published in the
Official Gazette of the Italian Republic. Thismove, orches‐
trated by the Federal Council of the LN together with
Calderoli, enabled the new LSP to be entitled to receive
indirect public funding as well as private contributions,
hence providing a “plan B” in case of an eventual freez‐
ing and confiscation of LN funds by judicial authorities.
The establishment of the LSP resulted in a unique
organizational parallelism: In the North, its structures,
resources, and personnel de facto coincided with those
of the old LN; in the South, the sister party NcS de facto
dissolved into the new LSP. Nevertheless, such a paral‐
lelism had left unsolved the issue of protecting the LSP
from the burden of the EUR 49 million debt—which the
party had told prosecutors they would pay back in seven
decades, in yearly instalments of EUR 600,000 a year—as
well as formally transferring themembers and structures
of the LN into the new political actor. These issues were
tackled in an extraordinary Federal Congress of the LN
(held 21 December 2019), which unanimously approved
a number of major changes to the federal statute, includ‐
ing the possibility of dual membership (i.e., in both LN
and LSP). Such changes established a division of labour
between two distinct entities: on the one hand, a “good
company,” the new LSP that is the only political and elec‐
toral actor left; on the other, a “bad company,” the LN,
which was “frozen” and continued to exist only to repay
the already mentioned debt, mostly through “the volun‐
tary contributions of its parliamentarians” (interview 4).
The final steps in the restructuring of the old LN
occurred in early 2020. Salvini “froze” all the federal bod‐
ies of the disempowered LN, while appointing one of his
most loyal collaborators (Igor Iezzi) as its federal commis‐
sioner to prevent any potential resurgence of the “old”
guard. Subsequently, through a series of notarial acts,
the regional branches of the old LN were re‐founded as
regional branches of the new League, led by commission‐
ers directly appointed by Salvini and loyal to him.
4. A Modern Mass‐Party in the North, a Wannabe
Mass‐Party in the South
The overall organizational logic of the LSP remains
shaped by Bossi’s very specific interpretation of the
mass‐party model: that of “a party with a Marxist
mould” (interview 31). While inviting the reader to the
abundant and rich literature on Bossi’s LN for details
(e.g., Albertazzi, 2016; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015;
Cento Bull & Gilbert, 2001; McDonnell & Vampa, 2016),
for the present purposes it suffices to highlight that
Bossi focused his efforts on developing an organization
characterized by the essential features of mass‐parties,
that is, one characterised by a grassroots activist base,
widespread territorial presence, and wide‐ranging activ‐
ities for party members, the latter encapsulated into a
political community shaped by ideology. Bossi’s LN was
characterized by the paramount importance of physical
and territorial activism, rigid screening mechanisms for
activists’ recruitment, and the formation of representa‐
tives through cadre schools, as well as by the develop‐
ment of a centralized party machine built upon the orga‐
nizational imperative of democratic centralism.
In the North, the LSP inherited the organizational
legacy of the LN and still carries out the traditional func‐
tions and activities characterizing the mass‐party model
by reinterpreting it in a modern way. In the South, the
LSP is better understood as a “wannabe” mass‐party at
an embryonic stage of development, as it is trying to
replicate the organizational features and practices it has
consolidated in the North, but not without difficulties.
4.1. Degree of Organization
The LSP is characterized by a considerable “degree of
organization,” to use Janda’s (1980) terminology, for two
key reasons. First, the structures, resources and (the vast
majority of) members of the old LNwere poured into the
new state‐wide organization. Second, as the statute of
the LSP (2018) is very similar to the LN’s statute before
its transformation into a bad company (LN, 2015), it is
evident that the party has attempted to export its orga‐
nizational model across the whole peninsula.
A comparison between the organizational chart of
the LN (Figure 3) and that of the new LSP (Figure 4) high‐
lights the disempowerment of the former in favour of the
latter. In fact, crucial bodies and territorial levels of the
party organization that are essential for conducting polit‐
ical activities do exist only in the new League (indicated
in bold in Figure 4). Instead, the LN was “frozen,” mean‐
ing that “there will be no secretaries, there will be no
branches. It will be de‐structured” (interview 4).
Differently from the LN, the new LSP maintains a
high degree of organization and structural articulation,
as well as vertical linkages (Figure 4), all of them key
features of mass‐parties (Panebianco, 1988). At the fed‐
eral level, the key bodies of the LSP are the Federal
Secretary, the Federal Council, the Federal Congress,
and the Organizational and Territorial Federal Officer.
The Federal Secretary coordinates and superintends all
of the LSP’s bodies and is granted extensive powers that
virtually shape every aspect of party life. The Federal
Congress convenes every three years: It is formally
granted the power to elect the Federal Secretary, and
its functions include setting the political and program‐
matic line and approving changes to the federal statute.
The Federal Council is chaired and summoned by the
Federal Secretary and includes, inter alia, the secretaries
and representatives of the LSP’s regional branches. It con‐
venes every three months, and among its extensive pre‐
rogatives is the ability to determine the party’s general
course of action and to decide on a wide range of top‐
ics. A clear indication of the new LSP’s efforts tomaintain
and replicate amass‐party organization across the penin‐
sula is provided by the existence of an Organizational
and Territorial Federal Officer, who is appointed by the
Federal Secretary.




















Figure 3. Organizational chart of the LN, “the bad company.” Bodies in italics do exist in the LN but do not exist in the new
LSP. Source: Own elaboration based on LN (2021).
The LSP is structured into different territorial levels:
federal (i.e., state‐wide), regional, provincial, and munic‐
ipal. These are connected by a delegated structure. Each
sub‐national level of the organization almost perfectly
mirrors the bodies of the federal party at smaller scale,
thus resembling a matryoshka doll. While the old LN was
structured in thirteen regional units called “nations,” in
the North and Centre of the peninsula, the LSP is con‐
stituted by twenty‐two regional territorial articulations
covering the entire Italian territory, which are formally
bestowed with organizational, administrative, patrimo‐
nial and financial autonomy. The word “nation,” which
was previously used to refer to each of the individual
regions and was so important in the federalist imaginary
of the old LN, is never used in the federal statute of the
LSP, suggesting a dramatic ideological and symbolic rup‐
ture with the past.
The LSP is further structured into provincial and
municipal branches, called “territorial delegations.”
The provincial branch coordinates the activities ofmunic‐
ipal branches, which are based upon a network of
activists, and constitute the backbone of the organiza‐
tional architecture of the party. Northern party repre‐
sentatives highlight that local branches meet on a regu‐
lar basis (usually at least once a month, and on a weekly
basis in some areas) and emphasize their decisive role
in achieving territorial rootedness. This network is also
essential for the recruitment, screening, socialization,
value‐infusion, and control of activists.
However, there are important differences between
Bossi’s LN and the Salvini’s LSP in terms of their rela‐
tive degree of organization. First, various representatives
underline that, even in the North, it is no longer pos‐
sible to ensure the physical existence of local branches
in small towns where there are few activists, which
consequently need to be aggregated in super‐municipal
branches (interview 22). Second, while the LN featured
a plethora of ancillary organizations, this universe was
already gonebefore the election of Salvini as party leader
(interview 4). However, today’s LSP still features themost
important and energetic of its ancillary organizations of
the past: the Lega Giovani (Youth League), the direct heir
of the old Movimento dei Giovani Padani (MGP, Young
Padanians Movement), which is essential to carry out
activities on the ground and serves as a privileged chan‐
nel for the recruitment of (future) party representatives,
at least in the North (interview 37).
In the light of the discussion above, there are good
reasons to consider the League as the “most structured
political party in Italy” (interview 17), at least as long
as the historical strongholds of the LN are concerned.
However, party representatives underline that despite
the party’s efforts, organizational structuration and ter‐
ritorial rootedness in the South are still in an embry‐
onic phase. Interviewees argue that the LSP has the
“willingness to take root” and to “be present on the
ground” in Calabria as well as in the broader South,
where it “imported a model from the North” (inter‐
view 37). However, the LSP’s organizational presence is
so far “patchy” (interview 27) and only a few areas have a
“well‐structured group” (interview 40). Interestingly, dif‐
ferently from Northern regions where the local branches
are mostly self‐financed by local activists, sympathizers
and representatives (e.g., interviews 11, 15, 29), the




























Figure 4. Organizational chart of the LSP, “the good company.” Bodies indicated in bold do exist in the LSP but do not exist
in the LN. Source: Own elaboration based on LSP (2018).
five physical branches of the LSP in Calabria are directly
financed by the national party (interview 40), a fea‐
ture showing the commitment of the national party to
develop an organizational structure in the region.
4.2. How Does the Party Try to Attract Members
and Activists?
The LN experienced a dramatic collapse in its member‐
ship figures following the scandal that led to Bossi’s resig‐
nation (McDonnell & Vampa, 2016), and while party offi‐
cials did not provide me with updated figures on party
membership, it is important to recall that themass‐party
model is not defined by numbers per se. Rather, inter alia,
it is defined by the drive to recruit new members, espe‐
cially with the goal of developing an activist grassroots
base to improve the party’s ability to reach out to the
wider electorate (see Albertazzi & van Kessel, 2021).
To understand how the LSP pursues this objective
and what incentives it offers to prospective members
and activists it is essential to underline that, similarly
to the “old” LN, the LSP (2021) distinguishes between
soci sostenitori (supporter members) and soci ordinari
militanti (activist members). Supporter members are
important because they provide some funding by paying
EUR 10 every year, while activist members constitute the
organizational backbone of the party, as they are enti‐
tled to active and passive voting rights and have a duty
to participate in its activities on a continuous and regu‐
lar basis. For the purposes of this analysis, I adopt the
re‐categorization of Clark and Wilson’s (1961) incentives
proposed by Albertazzi (2016). According to this scholar,
purposive incentives relate to the “importance of party
programmatic goals and ideology”; personal incentives
evoke a “sense of identity being shaped by activism,”
which provides a sense of “fulfilment,” “satisfaction,” or
even “a reason to live” to members, while communitar‐
ian incentives refer to “the party’s ability to create and
foster communities of like‐minded individuals”; finally,
material incentives refer to personal gain or reward
acquired by the activist (Albertazzi, 2016, pp. 121–122).
Interviews reveal that potential supporter members
are reached “through gazebos,word ofmouth, and social
media campaigns” (interview 24), and a key role is played
by purposive incentives that do not evoke simply the core
of the League’s message but also its perceived embodi‐
ment in Salvini’s persona, as suggested in interview 31:
“[Salvini] says the things I would say, he says them as
I would….To demonstrate my affinity I take the party
card.” Salvini’s alleged capacity to speak on behalf of
the ordinary people is perfectly consistent with the self‐
professed populist nature of the party and is strikingly
similar towhat occurredwithin Bossi’s LN (see Cento Bull
& Gilbert, 2001, p. 21).
Purposive incentives play a crucial role in the recruit‐
ment of new supporter members in both the North
and the South, while Northern party representatives
argue that a key role in becoming an activist member
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is played by “self‐motivation” (e.g., interviews 1, 14,
21, 30). Northern representatives also underline that
activist members’ recruitment is fostered by purposive
incentives related to the desire to actively contribute to
the achievement of party goals and by the provision of
communitarian incentives. Significantly, communitarian
incentives are also essential to maintaining activist mem‐
bers over time, because being a leghista (i.e. a member
or sympathizer of the League) often has negative reper‐
cussions on private life, social relationships, and even
personal finance. Most notably, in the North, these costs
are compensated by the development of a “microcosm,
where the affections, in some cases even colleagues,
friends… the personal world is built within the bound‐
aries of leghismo” (interview 9). This microcosm corre‐
sponds to a community of true “believers” (Panebianco,
1988, p. 26), a key feature of mass‐parties, and helps to
protect the party from careerists and infiltrators.
Finally, some representatives consider the possibility
of becoming a candidate in elections a further reason
to become an activist member of the League. However,
given the demanding nature of activism within the party,
the importance of this material incentive appears sub‐
ordinate and secondary in comparison to purposive and
communitarian ones, at least in the North. In the South,
instead, given the newness of the party organization,
activist members are still few and, most importantly, the
LSP is often blamed for choosing candidates with little
or no previous experience of activism in the party (inter‐
views 38, 39, 40).
4.3. The Role of the Internet and Social Media in Party
Organization and Activism
The LSP has taken advantage of the cost‐effectiveness
and immediacy of new technologies to perform the typ‐
ical functions of mass‐parties in a modern way, a neces‐
sity following the abolition of direct public funding to
political parties in Italy. WhatsApp and Facebook groups
are now essential to coordinate party activities and to
foster activism more generally. Indeed, they are crucial
to organize and advertise, in a cost‐effective and immedi‐
ate way, a wide range of political and non‐political activ‐
ities on the ground, as well as to ensure a continuous
flow of communication, which results in a sort of internal
party broadcasting that favours value‐infusion and mem‐
ber encapsulation.
The LSP has its own website and is active on all
the major social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram,
Twitter, YouTube); virtually all municipal branches of the
party have a Facebook page. Salvini himself is very active
on social media and has personal profiles on Facebook,
Instagram, TikTok, Twitter, and YouTube. Salvini is not
only the Italian politician with the largest number of fol‐
lowers on all the social media platforms, but his success
is remarkable even in a comparative perspective: In early
2020 he became the first political leader in Europe to
reach 4 million followers on Facebook.
However, Salvini’s popularity and the unprecedented
personalization of the party message and public image
under its leader should not lead to the conclusion that
today’s LSP has abandoned the mass‐party model, nor
that it has become a property of its leader. Indeed, the
LSP is far from being a “personal party” (cf. Kefford
& McDonnell, 2018). Of course, Salvini has the “brand,
which today is personified in the persona of the leader”
(interview 10), and interviewees commonly underline
the vital importance of personalization for the elec‐
toral rise of the party (e.g., interview 19). However,
personalization does not mean that the expectation
of the LSP’s lifespan is perceived to be dependent on
the political lifespan of its current leader, something
that, instead, is typical of personal parties (Kefford &
McDonnell, 2018). In fact, Northern representatives do
acknowledge a potential scenario “after Salvini” (inter‐
view 20): “We feel leghisti, and we feel to be the party.
So, whether the leader of the party is called Bianchi,
Neri, Rossi, Verdi, or whatever the name, one is always
a leghista” (interview 19). Of course, this applies to the
North, while whether the party has a future in the South
in a “post‐Salvini’’ era is open to debate.
Having clarified why Salvini’s party should not be
considered a personal party, it can be underlined that
the new LSP is fostering a modern interpretation of the
mass‐party model through the systematic usage of the
TRT formula (TV, rete, territorio, that is, television, net‐
work, territory) developed by Salvini’s strategist, Luca
Morisi. The TRT formula informs party workings at all lev‐
els and can be understood as a powerful way of bridg‐
ing physical and digital activism; this principle is clearly
inspired by marketing, in which the blend of the phys‐
ical and digital worlds is commonly referred to by the
term “phygital.” The TRT formula implies the continu‐
ous interaction and coordination of party activities and
messages between traditional media, social media and
activism on the ground (interview 18), hence “multi‐
ply[ing] the message… hundreds, thousands of times”
(interview17). This formula is taught in cadre schools and
regularly adopted by party representatives at all levels,
as explained in interviewe 18:
I’m a small cog in a big machine, but tonight I’ll be
on local TV, I’ll put my banner on the social net‐
works….The next day I’ll broadcast the video of my
interview on TV using a new media….In the morning
I’ll be doing a gazebo, so: TV‐network‐territory in a
continuous way.
The TRT formula delivers the image that the League
and its key representatives are present “on the ground,”
differently from the other parties that have long aban‐
doned their societal roots and linkages with the “ordi‐
nary man.” Thanks to the pervasive adoption of the TRT
formula, the LSP has pioneered a modern form of mass‐
party built upon phygital activism, through which it is
capable of performing key functions and activities of the
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 228–239 234
traditional mass‐party in a more efficient and immediate
way. Physical and digital activism reinforce each other,
producing an amplifying effect that boosts the visibility
of the party at the mass‐level, delivering the image that
the LSP, its representatives, and activists are constantly
on the ground.
It is important to underline that the success of the
TRT formula requires the presence of local commit‐
ted activists for reasons related to both logistics (e.g.,
the concrete organization of a gazebo) and credibility
(e.g., leafleting is more effective when made by locals),
because “no communication agency nor no amount of
money would give you the same result” (interview 18).
Also in Calabria, people get closer to the LSP if they see
representatives or activists “on the ground and social
media, making an effort to solve a problem” (inter‐
view40). However, given the uneven and spotty organiza‐
tional development of the LSP in Calabria (interview 27),
in many areas of the region (and of the South more gen‐
erally), the TRT formula is still disproportionately focused
on the persona of Matteo Salvini, who aims to compen‐
sate for the lack of territorial presence. Following the
principles of the TRT formula, Salvini regularly travels
across the peninsula to take part in various events, and
his visibility is amplified through the usage of traditional
and socialmedia.While this strategy is functional to gath‐
ering votes and public attention, with Salvini being often
seen as “the only leader who comes to visit these areas”
in the South (interview 32), this is also criticized by some
intervieweeswho complain that it hinders organizational
development and political activism:
[Activists] only speak about going to eat pizza, about
going to rallies and saying “hooray for Salvini!” “go
Salvini!” After which [activism] fades into agony and
oblivion. (Interview 38)
Salvini has come to Calabria at times, made a three‐
minute speech saying the same things, and this was
followed by an hour and a half posing for selfies. This
is not politics. (Interview 39)
4.4. Reasons to Grow an Active Base of Members
and Activists
Coherently with its long‐standing vocation as a mass‐
party, the League actively seeks to foster an activist grass‐
roots base, which is essential to fulfil disparate inter‐
nal and external goals, as well as to carry out practical
and symbolical functions. Party representatives explain
that activists organize a wide range of activities, which
include, among others, leafleting, gazebos, local festivals,
rallies, protest actions, convivial events, and book pre‐
sentations. Activism and ideology encapsulate members
in what is usually perceived as a “family” or a “team,”
which make the grassroots activist base a competitive
weapon that can be mobilized at any time, at least
in Northern regions. The presence of an activist grass‐
roots base is considered as “what saves you politically”
(interview 18), an organizational asset making the LSP
“much more resistant when is losing support” and help‐
ing it “growmuch faster”when conditions are favourable
(interview 24). Furthermore, an activist grassroots base
is also functional to providing an aura of credibility and
authenticity to the LSP’s (self‐declared) populist nature.
Activists are essential to ensure that gazebos and leaflet‐
ing activities are regularly carried out throughout the
year, but also to deliver the idea that the party is always
present on the ground to hear citizens’ concerns and
grievances. This is crucial to differentiate it from the
other parties, which, according to many party represen‐
tatives, show up only during election campaigns.
The long and continuous effort by the League to
invest in grassroots activism since the early Bossi years
has produced in Northern regions what a representative
(interview 9) acutely defined as the “leghista of proxim‐
ity.” As he explains:
In the North is easy to meet someone who is a mem‐
ber of the League, and [this] gives the party a human
dimension, in which people can identify, not just
because there is Salvini on the television, but also
because there is Roberto who is a tobacconist.
Therefore, the leghista of proximity fulfils both practical
and symbolical functions: He or she is not only essential
to carry out key activities typical of the mass‐party for
free, but also to provide an aura of authenticity to the
LSP. The goal of delivering an image of authenticity is also
being pursued in Calabria: “For us it’s very important at a
communicative level to make people understand that it
is us who make the League….Salvini can give indications,
but politics is made on the ground” (interview 40).
5. Centralization and Internal Democracy
The LSP is a hyper‐centralized party following Janda’s
(1980, p. 108) criteria. It is characterized by very little
space for internal democracy (even more so than dur‐
ing Bossi’s era), and in line with its Leninist imprinting,
the organizational imperative of the LSP remains demo‐
cratic centralism, a feature enabling the party to deliver
an image of unity and cohesiveness at the mass‐level.
5.1. Centralization
The LSP is characterized by the disproportionate con‐
centration of power in three federal bodies, which
can be defined as the trident of power: the Federal
Secretary, the Federal Council, and the Organizational
and Territorial Federal Officer. Whereas the Federal
Secretary holds a dominant position, an important con‐
current role is played by the other two components
of the trident of power, which, directly or indirectly,
impact and steer the activities and workings of the
LSP at both the federal and sub‐national levels (see
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Figure 4). The overall functioning of the party machine
is informed by the principle of “democratic centralism”
(interview 18), the core organizational imperative of tra‐
ditional Marxist‐Leninist parties. As an influential repre‐
sentative (interview 30) explains:
We discuss, then the secretary makes the synthe‐
sis….The Federal Council of the League is compact,
united, there are no different souls….There is inter‐
nal debate, but as soon as the meeting ends we are
all compact and united.
Significantly, the LSP’s course of action in political and
programmatic terms (including party manifestos and
electoral alliances, both at the national and sub‐national
levels), its internal rule‐making, its administrative, eco‐
nomic and financial management, as well as the man‐
agement and enforcement of internal discipline are dom‐
inated, directly or indirectly, by the Federal Secretary
and the Federal Council, and often register a concur‐
rent role of the Organizational and Territorial Federal
Officer. The latter is essential as “it cascades the direc‐
tives down” to the other levels of the organization (inter‐
view 15) and ensures the multi‐level coordination of
party activities on the ground. Power is also centralized
at the federal level in terms of candidate and person‐
nel selection. The Federal Secretary expresses an opinion
on the candidatures to elective positions at the various
levels, while the Federal Council determines the candi‐
date lists for general and European elections and ratifies
the regional branches’ proposed candidacies for the posi‐
tions of regional governor and regional capitals’ mayors,
as well as their respective candidate lists.
In the historical strongholds of the party, the orga‐
nizational Leninist mould still de facto survives, aiming
at bringing within institutions representatives socialized
to party values and hierarchy, trained in party cadre
schools, and selected following a strict cursus honorum.
However, even though such a cursus honorum is widely
valued by representatives (e.g., interviews 3, 10, 11, 24),
who underline the importance of “paying your dues,” the
new party regulation (LSP, 2021, Art. 17), maintains that
“the Federal Council can establish, for each single elec‐
toral session of any level, the criteria of seniority ofmem‐
bership necessary to propose candidates or to be can‐
didates.” This provision seems particularly relevant for
the South and suggests a further centralization of power
in the hands of the federal party. More generally, candi‐
date lists and alliances at the sub‐national level require
approval from the hierarchically superior level. It is also
worth stressing that the League’s communication is also
hyper‐centralized, through a cascade pattern from the
federal level down to the municipal one, a feature that
favours a coordinated implementation of the previously
mentioned TRT formula.
Broadly speaking, the federal level dominates the
sub‐national levels through the so‐called sistema di con‐
trollo e garanzia (system of control and guarantee),
which makes sure that the various levels of the party
organization are checked, monitored and held account‐
able to those that are hierarchically superior. This mecha‐
nism ensures organizational coordination and coherence.
Deviations from the federal party line are regulated by
means of commissariamenti, that is, the replacement of
a givenmonocratic or collegial body with commissioners,
who are granted full powers in a given territorial area.
The instrument of commissariamenti played a deci‐
sive role in the disempowerment of the old LN in favour
of the new LSP. In the North, by taking advantage of the
impossibility of having sub‐national congresses given the
formal preclusion of dual membership in the “old” and
“new” League, Salvini used the instrument of commissari‐
amenti to replace various elected secretaries and colle‐
gial bodies of the “old” LN. This strategy has served a
double function: on the one hand, maintaining the con‐
solidated structure that the LN had established in its his‐
torical strongholds; on the other, ensuring that key posi‐
tions within the party were held by individuals loyal to
the leadership and to the party’s new ideological course.
In the South, the loose approach that initially char‐
acterized NcS was supplanted by a top‐down and
centralized approach to party building dominated by
the Northern elite and commissioners from the North.
Commissioners were granted full powers in the area
of their competence and given the task of exporting
the key features and internal mechanisms that char‐
acterized the old LN to the South, while attempting
to protect the process of party building from infiltra‐
tors and careerists. Interestingly, most of the commis‐
sioners have been Lombards, in line with the histori‐
cal dominance of this regional branch in the old LN,
and have been given the explicit task of exporting its
organizational model and even its “mentality” (inter‐
view 40). For instance, Cristian Invernizzi, an MP from
the Northern city of Bergamo, was regional commis‐
sioner in Calabria between May 2019 and January 2021:
He was “Salvini’s emanation in Calabria,” and his task
was “to organize, structure the party, even dictate the
political line” (interview 25), as well as to trying “to fos‐
ter the leghista mentality” in the area (interview 40).
Unsurprisingly, this Northern commissioner was often
criticized by the Calabrian grassroots for his top‐down
management of the party (interviews 38, 39).
More generally, the party in the central office seeks,
in the South, “to protect the brand, in a way. If you get a
criminal elected because you have not checked before…
the main damage is suffered by the brand,” to the point
of being “even paranoid at times” (interview 31), but
this results in the LSP being perceived as “detached from
the real needs of the territory” (interview 38). The dif‐
ficult task of also protecting the brand from individu‐
als using the party as a “train” just to pursue a political
career (interview 40) is pursued in particular thanks to
the action of commissioners who oversee candidature
lists and control appointments to internal party positions
(interviews 15, 25, 27, 31, 32, 39).
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All in all, the League’s organization looks:
A bit military….We make clear that there is a hierar‐
chy and that this hierarchy cannot be questioned in
any way [but] we have some difficulties in building
the structure in the South, becausewe try to convey…
the concept of hierarchy… but there they all want to
be protagonists. (Interview 31)
Finally, it is worth underlining that exporting the orga‐
nization model of the League into the South is further
complicated by the electoral rise of Fratelli d’Italia (FdI),
a populist radical right party (Zulianello, 2020) led by
Giorgia Meloni that has a great appeal in the area.
Interviewee 38 underlines that “[FdI] is the night‐
mare of the League,” and interviewees from the South
explain that Meloni’s party is attracting not simply for‐
mer LSP voters, but also former party members (inter‐
views 25, 37, 39, 40).
5.2. Internal Democracy
The imperative of democratic centralism leaves very lit‐
tle space for dissenting voices and internal democracy.
Supporter members have virtually no rights at all, while
activist members are closely scrutinized in terms of loy‐
alty and dedication to the party, subject to disciplinary
sanctions ranging from written reprimands to expulsion.
All in all, while the duties of activist members are exten‐
sive, their prospects to have a say are poor in all the key
dimensions of party life and workings.
Northern party representatives underline that local
party meetings are important to ensure internal debate
and the involvement of activists. However, democratic
centralism leaves “the last word” to party secretaries
at all territorial levels (interview 12), and this does not
commit only activists to the party line, but elected rep‐
resentatives as well. For instance, the LSP’s represen‐
tatives (including MPs) have a duty to regularly report
their activities not only to the federal level of the party
but also to the sub‐national levels of the party organi‐
zation, such as the municipal branch and the regional
branch they belong to. Hence, as it was in Bossi’s era,
party members can discuss and meet at the various lev‐
els of the party organization, often with the participa‐
tion of elective representatives, but their ability to influ‐
ence decision‐making, the political line and candidatures
is close to zero.
While interviewees from the North usually mention
the fact that it is possible to easily get in touch with
party representatives of the League to ask for informa‐
tion, help or advice, and they interpret this as a form of
democracy, just like participating in local party meetings,
interviewees from the South tell a different story. They
lament the absence of coordination between the party in
public office and the party in central office, so that “you
don’t know where to turn because no one answers you,”
while internal debate seems poor also during local party
meetings because of the extreme centralization of power
in the hands of the (federal) party (interview 39).
All in all, the only tool that can be used by mem‐
bers to influence the general course of the League is the
election of party leaders at various territorial levels, but
this chance has also remained a dead letter in the last
few years because of the widespread usage of commis‐
sariamenti. Although party congresses at all levels were
initially frozen because of the transition from the old
LN to the new League, the Covid‐19 pandemic has con‐
tributed to postpone them sine die, raising profound con‐
cerns among many interviewees in both the North and
the South.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that an important
innovation in terms of internal democracy was the
extension of the electorate for federal leadership elec‐
tions in both 2013 and 2017—from congress delegates
to activist members with at least one‐year seniority,
as a derogation from the formal statutory provisions.
However, rather than actually democratizing the party,
primary elections resembled plebiscitarian coronations
for Salvini, who obtained crushing victories against his
rivals. These translated into a “surplus” legitimacy that
Salvini exploited to both abandon the regionalist ideo‐
logical raison d’être of the LN and to transform it into a
politically inactive bad company.
6. Conclusion
Today’s LSP is characterized by a kind of “territorial
dyscrasia.” In the North, the LSP inherited the organi‐
zational capital of the old LN and exploits it to carry
out the traditional functions and activities of the mass‐
party model in a modern way. In the South, the LSP
is better understood as a “wannabe” mass‐party, as
it actively tries to replicate the organizational features
and practices it has consolidated in the North. However,
exporting, instilling and routinizing the organizational
imperatives of loyalty, activism, and dedication will
be a very demanding and time‐consuming enterprise.
Organizational development in the South remains at an
embryonic stage, and the LSP’s strategy for nationaliza‐
tion has so far produced a “quasi‐colonial” structure
dominated by, and dependent on, the Northern elite.
This article has crucial implications for our under‐
standing of the mass‐party organizational model in the
contemporary world. While Bossi’s LN was a mass‐party
in a traditional sense, the case of the LSP suggests
that new technologies can be successfully exploited to
develop a modern form of mass‐party. As previously
mentioned, a key feature of mass‐parties is the develop‐
ment of an activist grassroots base to improve the party’s
ability to reach out to the wider electorate (Albertazzi &
van Kessel, 2021).
In this respect, this article has suggested that LSP
is characterized by the desire to act and be perceived
as a mass‐party; however, it has pioneered an innova‐
tive interpretation of the latter organizational model.
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Indeed, the LSP can be understood as a modern mass‐
party whose key feature is ceaseless phygital activism,
which is a blend of digital and physical activism that is
far frombeing limited to election times. Phygital activism
is sought on a continuous basis and aims at boosting
the visibility of the party at the mass‐level, thanks to a
synergy between traditional in‐person and face‐to‐face
activism, performed by a grassroots base, and modern
online activism, carried out through social media and
instant messaging systems.
A modern mass‐party grounded on phygital activism
aims to deliver the image that the party is constantly
on the ground to collect citizens’ concerns, and the
continuous interaction between physical and digital
activism also fosters the development of a political com‐
munity that encapsulates members through ideology.
Most notably, these are key functions performed by
mass‐parties: The case of the LSP suggests that phy‐
gital activism enables the reinterpretation of a tradi‐
tional organizational model in a modern, more effi‐
cient, immediate, and less bureaucratic way, making
it an asset capable of meeting the challenges of the
twenty‐first century.
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